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In the Supreme Court 
of the State llf Utah 
Q. T. NHRPHERD, 
J>faintif( and AJjlJrlfrmt, ). 
vs. 
~fAX B. HOLBROOK and 
BLAX< 'HI·~ C. HOLBROOK, his 
wife, 
JJr_fr11drmts nnd Respm1deuts. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 8549 
This ras0 is lwfon· this Court on appeal from a jn<lg-
ment of t lie District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
0f the Niah• of Utah, in and for \Iillard County, in favor 
of tlw defell(lants and ag-ainst th0 plaintiff, in an action 
Lried before tlt0 conrt sitiin~ without a jm·~·. rrlw jn<lg-
ment of til(• trial court w:1s "that plaintiff takP notl1ing: by 
his complaint and 1 hat d0f01Hlants hnv0 and n•<'O\"Pl' !'rom 
pia inti t"l' all ('o:-;t:-; of t hi:-: action.'' 
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Plaintiff commenced this action in claim and deliY. 
ery to obtain possession of certain chickens, alleging a 
special interest by reason of being the chattel mortgagee 
under a chattel mortgage executed hy one Kennetli E. 
Barker and his wife on January 1C>, 195:2. Defendants 
elaim title to the chickens under a sales contract dated 
.] an nary 18, 1950, which the~, claim to be conditional not 
only as_ to the real propert~,, as to which there is no dis-
pute, but also as to the chickens involYed in this eontro-
\'ersy, ·which plaintiff Yigorously disputes. 
STATR~IEXT OF FACTR 
On Jan nary 18, 1950, defendants and respondents 
entered into a \Yritten agreement (Ex. 1) with l{enncth 
1~. Barker and his wife whereby the Holbrook~ agreed to 
sell and the Barkers agreed to buy certain real e~tarc in 
::\Lillard ( \mnty, 1Ttah, together with 8181 chicken~ and 
other personal propert~-. Only chickens are involved in 
i hi~ cmlh'O\'Pr~~'· The Barkers turned over other prop-
t•rt~, worth a pproximatel~' three-fourths of the purchase 
price a~ a down payment. (Tr. 63, R. 79). 
So far a~ pertinent to the i:-;~ IH'~ of thi:-; cast'. the 
.\gTePnwn1 hehn,en Holbrooks and BarkPr;:-; can he ~um­
marir,ed :t::-~ follow::-;: 
1. That e X<'<'J din.~- for a ::--~1 i pula ted n1iuinnnn, the hal-
mwe of tlw pnrelw::-;c price should he paid out of 
''net inconlP.'' ( ~et' Paragraph i~ of the ~\gn.'L'­
nwut). 
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.-_) 
2. ''X et Income'' is defined in Par. 4 of the Agree-
ment. 
3. The Barkers were to maintain at all times approx-
imately 8000 chickens on the farm. 
And, respecting any title retaining provisions, the 
follow1ng paragraphs are quoted: 
"17. The Sellers on receiving the payments 
herein reserved to be paid at the times and in the 
manner mentioned agree to execute and deliver to 
the Buyers a good and sufficient Warranty Deed 
conveying title to the real estate described in para-
graph 1 hereof free and clear from any encum-
brance ... and to deliver an Abstract of Title show-
ing a good and marketable title in the Sellers ex-
cept as provided in this paragraph.'' 
"16. In the rv0nt of a failure to comply "With 
the terms hereof by the Bu~·c•rs, or upon failure to 
make an~- payments "when the sam<> shall ht·c·omc· 
due, or within 60 days thereafter, the NPllPrs ~dwll, 
at their option, he released from all ohligatiom; in 
la\v and equit~· to ron\·e~· said propert~· and all pay-
ments whieh ha v<• lH•<•n made t h<•rPtof'on• on this 
<'nni nH't h~· the Bn~·ers shaH lH• fori' Pi t<•d to the NPll-
f'rs as liquidated damages for the non-perforn1ance 
of the contract, and the Bu~·0rs agTP<' that the NP1l 
c•rs may, at th0i r option, r<•-<•nt<•r and take poss<'i-1-
:-;ion of said pn·mis(•s without legal pro(•(•:-;:-; as in 
its first and former estate, tog-<•tlJ<•r with all im-· 
prm·<·m<·nh..; and additions mad<· h~- thP Bu:·c•rs 
thereon, and the sai<l additions a11<\ imprm·<·nw11ts 
shall remain vvith tho land and h<·<·om<· t!H· JH'OJ wri.' 
of tlw N<·llers, tlw Bny<•rs becoming· at OIH'<' a i<·n-
ant at will of the Se1l0rs. It is ngT<'e<l th<~t tim0 is 
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the c•ssenec> of this AgreenH'nt.'' 
The Agreement has no title retaining provisions 
other than as quoted, and makes no provision whatever 
respecting increase or replacements of chickens. 
The Barkers went into possession of the real and per-
sonal property and commenced the egg· and chicken busi-
ness. They experienced financial difficulties to the end 
that Barkers became indebted to plailltiff for poultry 
feed and sundry supplies to the extent of $4750.00 (Tr. 
:>4-;)7, R. 70-73). Shortly prior to Jan nary V). HfJ:2, the 
plaintiff told the Barkers that he wanted a note secured 
by a chattel mortgage ( Tr .. );), R. 71) and after negotia-
tions the Barkers did on January 15, 19;5:2, gi \·e plaintiff 
a promissory note in that sum, secured by a chattel mort-
~!;a,g·e (Tr. 57, H. 73) on 7300 chickens (Ex. :2) aiHl--
''Together with all incrl'ases and replacements 
of an;; of sai(l ehickens." 
~ i lH'P ti tlc to increa~t> and replacement~ is invoh·ed 
in this rasP it nw:--· be well to state at thi~ point that Bark-
•·rs under the .\gT('PllWlJt received ~181 chickens; thctt at 
the 1 inw plaintiff took his mortgage only 1000 of the uri~­
]nnl <'hi<'b'lls rc>mainecl on the pn'mist>s (Finding of Fact 
~ o. 21) ; that at 1 ht' time den1and \\·a~ made on Holbrooks 
for possPssion ol' tlw chickens involvt>d in this action, Hone 
of tlw original chicken~ remained ( rrr. ~:~. R. 99) and that 
at. stt<'h timP all of tlw ..t-000 rhickens on the premist's \Yere 
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rcplacemenh; ('rr. H:l-H+, H. 99-100). 
Thereafter the plaintiff on the faith of the note and 
chattel mortgage extended further credit to: :the Barkers 
to the extent of approximately $3200.00. Being himself 
in need of money, he preYailed on Barkers to borrow that 
Hum of a bank and indorsed th<.• Barker not<' which Bark-
er did n __ ot pay. 
Barkers paid only $;)()8.\lO in reclnetion of his nqte to 
the plaintiff (Tr.1:2; R. :2H) and on or about the 29th day 
of September, 19i>.), commenced this action to recover im-
mediate possession of the chickens ancf to foreclose his 
chattel mortgage. At that time Barkers were indebt-
eel to plaintiff in a sum in rxeess of $8,000.00 including 
the hank note whieh plaintiff indorsed and which Barker 
<lid not pay. 
Prior to the romm('ll('('lllent of this aC'tion the Hol-
hrooks eommenced au action to reposs<.•ss the property 
l'm'ered hy the Agreement with Barker, siuee Barker had 
(1efaulted. In the <·ours<· of that litigation the Holbrooks 
and Barkers s<·ttled t1H_•ir difficulties by some payment 
from Holbrooks to Barkprs (Tr. lOG, R. 1:2:2) and po...,s<·s· 
~'ion of tlw r<'al prop<:rty and 4000 chickens (Tr. 108, H. 
] 24), whieh ,,·t·n· n·pla(·(•mc~nts alH1 not any of tlw original 
(•hirlwns, ,,·as g·i \"<•n to tlw Holhrooks. A I thoug-h phi in-
tiff k1ww of th<' aetion l~!•h\'<'<'11 Holbrooks awl Bark<~rs 
he was not a party to it. 
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED OX 
The errors relied on by the plaintiff for a reversal 
of the judgment of the trial court can be stated as follm;,·s: 
1. The Sellers, respondents herein, did not retain 
title to qhickens purchased hy the Buyer~ to replace those 
ehickens comprising the 8181 chickens which had been 
culled out or had died. 
II. Title to the original 8181 chickens passed from 
the Sellers to the Buyers upon execution of the Agree-
ment dated January 18, 1950. 
III. The Court erred in admitting into eYidence tes-
timony by l\Ir. Barker as to his understandings of vari-
ous words and provisions of the Agreement of January 
18, 1950, because the testimony wa~ inadmissable under 
the standard of interpretation to be applied in determin-
mg the meaning of the contract. 
IY. The admission of certain tc>stimony of Barker 
and ~I r. and ~f rs. Holbrook Yiolatecl the Parol E,·idence 
Hule. 
Y. The AgTN•nwnt gan' the Buyers the rig·ht to ~ell 
tlw chiekPns and the> SellPrs cannot therefore object to 
t liP appellant's m.ortg:tg't' whieh was gi n•n for Yalue . 
.ARG r ~fEX11 
I. 
The Sellers, respondents herein, did not retain title to 
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7 
chickens purchased by the Buyers to replace those chickens 
comprising the 8181 original chickens which had been culled 
out or had died. 
The chickens ·which the> appellant sought to reeoY<·r 
in this action b~~ virtue of his chattel mortgage "\H'l'e n·-
placemeuts of the 8181 originals. The mortgage was 
g-iven hYo years after the Agreement had been executed 
and at that time not more than 1000 of the original 8181 
birds remained (Finding of F1act Xo. 21). And at the 
time appellant commenced this action, none of the origi-
nal hens remained. ...\11 had been replaced hy younger 
birds. This fact is extremely significant in this case and 
·cannot b8 over-emphasi7.ed. It is appellant's contention 
that C\'C'll though this t 'ourt should hold that title to the 
original 8181 chickens \Vas retained by the sellers as sC>-
c:nrit~· for the balance of the unpaid purchase price, h:' 
no means can the agreement be inh·rpn·tc•d to als;J admit 
of the seller's retaining title to the replaeemc·n1s. Thus, 
appellant m·.~·r·s, tith• to the replacement C'hiC'kc·ns \\'as 
dearly in the lm~·<·rs <m<l t ]J(':"' wen• fn•e 1 o <'Xt><'llt i' to 
the appellunt a goc<l elmtt<·l mortgage on them. Appel-
lant's elHttt!·l mortga:.!Y was c•xpn•ssl:' made to exh•ll<l to 
inen·as<· aiHl n·plac·c·m(>llis and tlt<·n· can h<' no qnPst ion 
but wlwt it eo\·<'n·<l the e1Ji('k<'11S possPs:·w<l h:· 11H· ~l·llr.•rs 
(respondents ll<·rein) :d tlH• i ime this ac·tion W<ts com-
rn<·m~<'d. 
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1ng replacements in conditional sales contracts. Huw-
cver, the same rule should apply as in cases of chattel 
mortgages since both are security devises used in the ::;ale 
of personal property. The rule governing replacements 
in chattel mortgages is well stated at 10 Am. Jur., Sec. 
133, Page 802: 
''Whether a mortgage of a stock of goods cov-
ers additions and substitutions thereafter made in 
the ordinary course of business depends on the in-
tention of the parties as gathered from the language 
of all parts of the agreement, considered in relati0n 
to each other and interpreted ·with reference to Lle 
situations of the parties, and their objects, unless 
some established principle of law or sound public 
policy would thereby be violated. The inlrntiu;, tu 
corrr additions mul suhstitutious must be rlearly 
r':YpressPd in the instrument in order to charg·e per-
sons dealing with the stock vYith notice of that fact, 
and it has been held that, as a rule, the mortgage. 
must e.rpressly proride that it is to corPr additiou.;.; 
or substitutions wherr> the rights of third jJr>r.-.·11/S 
are i11rnlred." (Italics added). 
That 1 hr intrnt to include replaerments or after-ac-
(}nirrcl proprrt~· must hr clearly C'XJn·essed in the instru-
lnrnt (ser .lnJ/I'S on Clwttel J!ortgag(·s & Cond. Soles, Gth 
g<l., NP('. 17:~a. and the followi.n~.!,· cases: Ryan r. Roger.-. . 
. ,+Idaho :-109, !l-t. Pac. +~1. 1916 D .:\nn. Cs. 1~17: Cuuniii[J-
liaJ/1 r. ~llryo11 1roole11 .llills, 69 X .• T. Eq. 710,61 A. li:2: 
P . .!. Rlark l.ilflllhl'r Co. r. Turk, .)0 \Y~·o. 361, G~ P. ~d 510: 
and l11 rf' ThnJ11pso11, 16-t- Towa :20, 1-t-.) X. \r. 7G, 1~116 n. 
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Ann. ( ~s. 1210. In the last cited case the court stated that 
in Iowa 
"a pnrt.\' ma~· h~- express terms mortgage, and 
his mortgage 111<:1~· be made to cover, not only stock 
in existence, but additions and substitutions there-
after made in the ordinary course of business ... 
But the intent to do so mm~t be clearly e.rpressed in 
the mortgage, so as to charge persons dealing vvi t h 
the stock with notice of that fact.'' (Italics added). 
The court eitc•d with apprO\'al an excerpt from .lo111'.<..' 
on elwttel J1ortgages, 4-th Ed.,· Sec. 154-, wherein it is 
~tated in substance that new goods which arl' acquired 
h,v' wa~' of renewal of old goods, or in substitution for 
them, or which are paid for out of thL• proceeds of old 
goods, are not brought under t lw mortgage nnle~s the 
intent to do so he elt>arly shown. 
The eontraet of .Ltnllar:; 18, 19,)0, ean be seardwd in 
Yain for an:-: elcar express provision or any provision 
that the sc·lkrs \\'<•n• to holu titlt> to the ehi<'kt>ns brought 
upon the farm as r('phH·c·m(•ntf; of the 8181 originals. Fn-
dcr the rule of the above· cited c·as<•s, the sPllPrs did nul 
have title to tlw replacements. Tit](• to all repl<H·Prnt>Hls 
remained in Barkers as the pur<'hasc•rs of the replcH'l' 
ments from third pc•rso11s. vVhen tlw parties drafted 
and exeeuted the J\.'!,T<•<•nwnt of .January 18, UJ.)O, t1tC'~­
lJad it w~>ll in mind that the original 8181 rhiek(•11s woul(l 
he r('placcd from time to time by ,\'Ollll!.!,'Pl' hirds hecanRI' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
they provided that the buyers should operate the farm in 
an "efficient, economical and husbandlike m~nner" and 
the r_ecord is replete with testipwny of all parties and 
witnesses that it was necessary to replace chickens for 
such an operation. Yet it is significant that they studi-
ously avoided putting into their agreement any provi-
sion that title to the replacement birds should be held 
hy the sellers as security. They went so far as to pro-
·•ide that approximately 8000 chickens should be kept 
on the farm at all times knowing that in a short time 
all would be replacements, but made no provision that 
title to such replacements should be held by the sellers. 
Plaintiff is confident that this Court knows that cus-
tomarily chattel mortgages specifically cover increase 
and replacements where that is the intention of the 
lender and borrower, and equally it is true that con-
tracts make such specific pro'dsion where the parties 
netnnl!.{.- intend that title to increase and replacemeuts 
:-:honld he 111 the seller. 
There ~~ a logical rt>as(m or explanation ,,·hy the 
.\gTPement did not so proYide. Barkers had paid 
three-fourths of the purchase price or had traded land to 
tJwt valne (Tr. -+-+-~-.\ R. nO-ol). The Holbrooks we-re, or 
thought the~· wen', well secured h:· the title retaining- fea-
j nres of the AgTeement in connection with real property. 
The pro,·isiou respecting· the maintaining· of 8000 chick-
1'11:-; at all tim<>s wa:-; norp:-::-;ary in order that Barkers· net 
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·ll 
income would be sufficient to l>HY out the balance, but 
certainly does not have title-retaining features. A pro-
vision similar to the above-mentioned provision of the 
Agreement was construed by the court in Phillips 1.:. 
Rootlt, ;)8 Iowa '"Hlfl, 1:2 X. \Y. 481. The <'ollrt, after not-
.. ..~ :' 
ing that the mortgage did not <·xpr~·~sl~- proYide tha_t fu-
ture acquisitions to stock should he held as inclnde~l 1n 
the mortgage, f-ltatPd: 
_ "Tt is true, it (the mort.!!;ag·p) refers to a stoek 
of boots and f;hoes and clothing but it also schedules 
and clef-lrrilws the mortgaged goods. There \\'ere no 
g·oods mortgaged excepting such as arc selwdttlt•d 
because the languag·c is t.hat it is the propPrt.v <1e-
scribed in the followin_g· srheclnle. It may he that 
the parties intended to include future acquisitions 
of goo<ls. The provision that the mcn;tgagor should 
keep up the stock would seem to indicate something 
in that direction. But this is not a proceeding to 
rc•form the mortgage and we mus_t take it as it reads. 
;i \V e eannot extend its provision, nor ·find hy infer-
cnee ·what was intended. The rule allowing prop-
crt~' to he mortg·ag·<·<1 whieh is not yd in lwing·, or 
not owned h~- the mortgagor has in our opinion lw<•n 
extended quite far enough without allowing· it to 
he donP hy m<·rr· infc>rP1H'<'. '' 
.Tones in his 1 r<•atis<' 011 ('hattd Jlorf_r;rl,rJr·s & ('oJifl. 
Sales, Gth Ed., ~ec. 11:~<1, stat<·s the law to the s;llll!' t'i'F<•d. 
'There· h<·in_'-',· no elear (~xpn•ssion ol' inlPllt in 111(' 
AgTec·nwnt that tli(• seilerR should hold title to the re-
plae<·m.Pnt ehiek<'llR, aR rP<)'nirecl h~' th<~ nho\'<' ant.hori1i(•:-;, 
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12 
it follows that the sellers, respondents herein, cannot 
claim title to the replacement chickens. 
II. 
Title to the original 8181 chickens passed from the Sellers 
to the Buyers upon execution of the Agreement dated January 
18, 1950. 
An examination of the Agreement of January 18, 
1950, entered into between the Holbrooks, as sellers, and 
the Barkers, as buyers, discloses that it was the intention 
of the parties that title to the personal property de-
scribed in the Inventory attached thereto (which includes 
8181 chickens) should pass from the sellers to the buyers 
npon the execution of that agreement. The Agreement 
will not admit of a construction that title to the personal 
property should be retained by the sellers until the pur-
chase price had been paid in full, as \Yas their intention 
rrsrweting· the real P:-~tate. In Paragraph 17 of that 
Agreement it is proYided that title to the real estate 
Rhonld he conYcycd upon payment of the purchase price 
in full: 
"17. Thr ~t'llPrs on recei,·ing the pa~nwnt:-; 
herein n•sPrYPd to he paid at the times and in the 
manner ahoYP mentioned agree to execute and de-
liver to t hl' Buyers a good mHl sufficient \Yarranty 
DcPd conyp~·ing title to the real l':-;tatP dt>seribed in 
parag-raph 1 lwreof free and clear from any Pll<'Ulll-
hr:tll<'P ... and to dP 1i Yrr an ~\ h:-;t r:1ct of Tit lP slww-
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ing a good ancl markl'iable title in the ~eller~ PX-
cept as provided in this paragraph.'' 
There is no provision in the above paragraph or at 
<m:, other place in the Agreement for the vesting of title 
in the personal property in the lmyers upon tlH_•ir paying 
the purchase price in full. Had such been their intention, 
it is reasonable to assume that in Paragraph 17 pro·d-
sion would have been made to that effect. That the par-
ties <lid n_ot intend for the f-;c•llPr~ to retain title to Lhe 
personal property is further borne out by the provi:..;ion~ 
of Paragraph 16 wherein it i~ proYidc<l: 
"16. In tht• event of a failure to compl~· with 
the term~ hereof h~' the Bu~'(>l's, or upon failure to 
make> any payment~ when the ~arne shall become 
due, or 'vithin 60 <lays thereafter, the Sell<>r~ shall, 
at their option, be n·lva~<·d from all obligations in 
law and Pqui t,\' to ('011 rr·y said property and all pay-
ments wh ieh ha v<~ lwPn made theretofore on this 
rontrart 1>:· the Bu.\·<·r~ shall lH· forfeited to tht> 
~(·ll<·rs as liqnidat<•<l dam~u.!,·es for the non-pprform-
mH·e of tl1P contract, and t l1P Bll,\'<'1'~ agTP<' tlwt llw 
~<dl<·r:-: rna~', at th<·i r optio11, n·-r"Jtff'J' and tal·a~ po~­
sc•ssion of said /)rrmi::;f's 'vithont legal proePss as in 
it~ fir~t and former estat<•, tog;d.lwr with all im-
provements and addition~ made by th<' Bll.\'<'1'~ 
tlwreon, all<1 the sai<l addition:-; and improY<'lll('llb 
shall remain with the lnnd and hP<·onw tl1P pro]H~rt:· 
ofthe f-;c1lers, the Bnyprs l)(•<·oming- at mH·<· a ieuunl 
at will of the ~<'ll<'rs. It is agT<'Pd tl1at tim<> i~ th<: 
I'SS('Jl('l' of th)s ,\!_I,T<'<'ll"lt'llf." (Ttall<'S nd<lf><l). 
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Note the choice of words in that paragraph which \re 
have italicized: ''Convey,'' ''re-enter,'' ''premises,'' 
"tenant." They could not more clearly be limited to real 
property in their application. They are not words which 
would be employed hy a draftsman who intended to af-
fect personal property as well as real property. There 
is conspicuously absent from the Agreement an:~ provi-
sion for the recovering of the personal property upon 
the default of the lm:·er:-;. Thus it can only be assumed 
that the parties intended the :;.;ale of the personal prop-
erty to be absolute, that title pass from the sellers to the 
buyers upon the execution of the Agreement, and that the 
default of the buyer:;.; would have no affect on the title to 
the personalty. It should be remembered that the buyers 
had made a dovn1 payment of approximately :% of the 
value of the chicken ranch hy conyeyin,<.!_· to the sell~..·rs 
their farm in Korth Ogden (R. 60, Tr. -!-l-). and it is not 
unnatural in Yiew of that large down payment that the 
sPllPrs felt sufficiently :-;eenre in retaining only the title 
to the real Pstntt> and allowing the title to the pcr~onal 
property to pass at the timc> of the exrcntion of the .Ag-rt>C'-
m<>n t. 
If therc> he any donht as to the intent of the pnrtit•s 
<>xpr<>:-;s(•<l in tlH' AgTt>t•mt>nt as to when title to the per-
:-;onal propert:· passe(l from thP st•llPrs to the lm:••t•rs, rc-
~ourse should then he n1ade to 8('1'8. fi0-:2-:2 and ()·o-:!-.·; 
{"fnll (Yod<' .I 1111. 19:iH, wherein it is proYidt•d: 
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60-~-~- " ( 1) \Vhen• there is a contract to sell 
specific or ascertained goods, the property in them 
is transferred to the buyer at such time as the par-
ties to the· contract intended it to be transferred.. 
"(~) For the purpose, of ascertaining the iuLen-
tion of the partie•;.; regard shall be had to the terms 
of the contract, the conduct of the partie~, 11sages 
of trade and the circumstances of the case.'' 
60-2-3. "Fnless a different intention appears, 
the follovting are rules for ascertaining the inten-
tion of the parties as to the time. at which the prop-
c>rt.'' in the goods is to pass to the lmyer: . · 
''Rule (1) \Vhere there is an unconditional 
contract to sell specific goods in a deliYerable statt', 
the property in_the goods passes to the hnyer when 
the contract is made, and it is immaterial wlwtltt'l' 
the time of pa~ment, or tlH• time of deliYer:·, or 
both, is postponed.'' 
The 8181 c·Lickens dcsignatc•d 1n the inYc>ntor.'' ,\-ere 
specific goods in a deliverable state and under the above 
statutes title to them passed to the buyers at tl1<· time 
the agreement was si.~·ne(l, there being no different in-
tention manifested in tlH• A.!.!,TP('lll~'llt. A n'c·ent emw strik-
ing!.'- similar to tlH' inshmt case in which the court n·lit><l 
upon the above seetim1s of the l'niform Sales Act is floss 
r. Orr, 3 X .• J. '277, 69 A. 2d 7:W. There the plaintiff au<l 
defendant en ~\fan~h 18, 1946, l'llt<·r<·d into a wriltPll 
cl,!.!,Tcement for th(~ sal(' and purchase of a g·antg<' build-
;11!2,', the land on which it stood, and all the fH'r~onal prup-
(rty then on the pn·mis<·s, <>Xe<'pt for a hydraulic jack. 
Hig·ht of poss<·ssinn to the premis0s was g·in•n immccli-
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ately and payment and delivery of the deed was set for 
on or before May 1, 1946. About two days after the exe-
cution of the agreement, but before the buyer had taken 
actual possession of the premises, the personal property 
was stolen. In a suit by the seller to recover the purchase 
price of the personal property (which had been stated 
8eparately in the contract) the buyer contended that un-
der the agreement title to the personal property would 
not pass until execution and deliYery of the deed and 
payment of the purchase price for the real and per~onal 
vroperty, which was to he on or before ~lay 1, 1!J46J 
Hence, defendant argued, title to the personalty was in 
the seller on the date of the theft. The trial court ui-
rected a Yerdict for the plaintiff on defendant's opening 
statement, which ruling was upheld on appeal to the ~u­
preme Court of ~Pw Jersey. The latter court in its 
opinion, after acknowledging that the contract proYided 
for the payment of the purchase price (of both the realty 
and persona1t~-) simultaneously with the deliYery of the 
deed on ~[a~- 1, l!l-W, said: 
'• Although tinw of paynwnt for the personal 
property was postponed h~- the proYisions of the 
agreenw11t. there was no expression nPgatiYing the 
statuton· presumption of passag'l• of title when the 
<•OJI1t'a<·1 was sigHPd. 
'• If, aftt>r 'n•ighing the language employed in 
111<> contract, doubt still (•xists as to the interpreta-
tion of it, tiH•n, mulPr th0 statute, we turn to thl' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
'conduct of the parties' and the 'circumstances of 
the case' as there provided, 'for the purpose of as-
certaining the intPntion of the parties'. (citing· X . 
• J. statute identical to 60-2-2, U.C.AI 1953) ... 
'• ... Giving the defendants the benefit of l'Vel"y 
douht and assuming no inference as to their intent 
can be spelled out either by contract or hy their con-
duct, then the statutes apply unless the contract ex-
presses 'a different intention'. (citing X. J. statute 
identical to 60-2-3, U.C.A. 1953) ... lTnder the stat-
ute set forth above, the property in the goods passed 
to the buyers when the contract was made unless a 
different intention appears and it is imnmterial 
whether time of payment or the time of delivery or 
hoth be postponed. 
"\Vas tlwre anything in the contract to indi-
eate a different intention'! It is asserted such a 
contrary design appears in the provision for the 
later conveyance of title to the real l•statl•, but the 
contract deals with realty and personalty as spp-
arat~ and distin(·t transactions and there is no spP-
cific provision that the general rule for the imme-
diate transfer of personal property should not ap--
ply. It is presumed th<' partiPs C'ontradl'd in light 
of tlw statute and, if t hl'y had a purpose eont 1 a ry 
to the legislati V<' enactment, tht-~' would hav<' ex-
pressed it in C'h·ar and unmistakahl<' langmu!;P. 
~-,incling no such declaratio11, we conclude that the 
statut<•s control and title pass<·d on thP datP the 
eon tract waf-1 execnted.'' 
As in the a bon~ case, t h<'n· is nothing in tlw A.!!,'n'P-• 
ment between the Holbrooks and the Barkers to sugg-Pst 
that Rule 1 of See. 60-~-:~, U.< ~.A. 1 !1:>:~, should not apply. 
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'.L'here is nothing to negatiYc the. statutory enactment 
that title to personal property should pass immediately. 
\Ve have already noted that the;re is nothing providing 
for title to the personal property to pass simultaneously 
with the title to the real property, and there isno proYi-
Bion for allowing t~e sellers to retake the person~Hy in 
case. of the default bf the ,buyers. Title to the personal 
J)roperty, including th~ 8181 ch~ckens, therefore, passed 
on January 18,. 1950, when the Agreement was executed. 
It follQws that the buyers could give to the appellant a 
valid chattel mortgag·e on what remained of the original 
8181 chickens. 
IIL 
Th~ court erred in admitting into evidence testimony by 
Nfr. Barker as t.:> his und~rstanding of var~ous words and pro-
visions of the Agreeme:1t of January 18, 1950, because the tes-
timony was inadmiss.1ble under the standard of interpretation 
to be applied in determining the meaning of the contract. 
0\'Pr the ohjcrtion of counsel for the appellant, the 
trial eourt allowed counsel for the respondents to elicit 
from 1\f r. Barker, one of the buyer~. ·what his understand-
ing:-; wPrP a:-; to whether under the Agreement (1) the 
NPllerR retained an~' Ht'eluit~T for the balance of the JHH-
ehaN<.' prieP ·(H. 61-n:~. Tr. -t-.>-47); (:2) whether the. word 
"prPmi:-;p:-; '' in Paragraph 16 induded both land and 
I'll iek<'HH (R. n:~. Tr. -fi) ; ( :n the meaning- of 1 he word 
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''·property'' appearing 1n Paragraph 16 of the Agree-
ment wherein it is provided that in case of default of the 
lmyers, sellers shall have the option of being relieved of 
all obligation to convey the "property" (R. 64-64, Tr. 
48-49), and the meaning of the \H>r<l "premises" in said 
paragraph; ( 4) his understandings of Paragraph 10 (R. 
65-67, Tr. 49-51); ( 3) whether under the Agreement he 
had the right to se~l the chickens and replace them with 
younger hens (R. 66, Tr. 50); (6) how many chickens he 
had the right to sell (R. (i/-69, Tr. 30-3:2). 
In brief, the trial court permitted Barker and the 
Holbrooks, while on the witness stand, not only to vary 
the terms of a written contract by parol evidence, not only 
to testify to their claimed understanding of it, not only 
to interpret the meaning of words of legal import and 
place tlwir own construction on the contract, but permit-
ted them to acually re-write the entire contract according 
to their own desires, and attempt to hind this plaintiff 
who was not C\'t'll a part~· to it. 
Parenthetically, it is ohs<>n·<><l that not onl~· an~ 
Points III and IV well tak<·n even though this were a suit 
between the· parti<·s to the• Agreement, hut in this <·as<' 
the parti<·s to the AgT<'<'In<'nt an· attt•mpting· to hind a 
third person, this plaintiff . 
.. Appellant ('ont<'JHls that tlH· admission of tlt<> abon~ 
te>stimmt~· a]l(l th<' considerntion of it by tltt• trial court 
in int<·qn·<·tin.~· t l1<· AgT<·<>m<•nt constitutes reversil ll(• 
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C'rror because the Agreement Is an integrated contract 
and cannot be interpreted accor~ing to the understand-
~ng~ of the parties as to what its various provisions mean. 
The Restatement of Co11fracts, Sec. 228, -defines as inte-
l.!Tation as follows: 
''An agreement is int~grated where the par-
ties thereto adopt a writing. or writings_ as the final 
and complete expression of the agreement. An in-
tegration is the writing or ·writing-s so adopted." 
Respondents havr. never contended othen~.rise than 
that the Agreement of January 18, 1950, contain eli the 
whole agreement between the Barkers and them. ':Pherc 
Leing an integration, it was patently erroneous for the 
trial court to allow Barker, one of the parties to that 
integration, to testif~T as to what he understood variuus 
words and provisions to mean. ThP Restatcmnlf of Cun-
lracts, f-Ire. 230, ~d~ fol.·th the standard to lH! used in in-
t<·rpr<.•ting· an intPg;rated contract: 
',.rrhe stmHlard of interprPtation of an integra-
tion, t>x<·t•pt where it produees an c-unbignou::-; re-
sult, or is exduded hr a rule of law establishing a 
clPfini t P mcanin !.!,', i::-; the n1eaning; that would be at· 
tachrtl to the int.egrntion h~- a re'asonabl~- intelli~·C'11t 
person aequaint<•d with all operative usages and 
knowing all tlw ei relnnstanrPs prior to and eon-
tenlporanrous with tlw making· of the intc·;!_Tation, 
u/1/('/' tluw ()J"(/1 sfall'liii'Jtfs by fh(' parties of wliat 
tlu·!t i11k11dl'd it to mca11 ... (Italics addt•<l). 
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In comment (a) to the above section, it is stated: 
'' ... But oral statements by the parties of 
what they intended th~ written language to mean 
are excluded, though these statements might show 
the parties goa ve their wonls a meaning that would. 
not otherwise be apparent. Such a common under-
standing may justify reformation, but cannot be 
the basis of interpreting an integration. So the 
meaning given the words of a writing by a reason-
ably intelligent third person will be given them, 
even though that meaning is not one that would be 
anticipated by one par(f or the other.'' 
See also comment (b) to Section 230. TV iii i.1dou t)i1 
flo11fratfs, Rev. Ed., Ser. 607, is in acrord with the abo,~e 
rule of the Restatement. This court in Erickson r. Bas-
fia11, 98 etah 587, 10:2 P. 2d 310, applied tlw RulP of :--,<·e. 
230 to the integrated contract in that easP. 
In Jliller r. 0. B. Jhr'li11for·k. ~10 :\finn. 1:>~, ~!17 K. 
\Y. 7~4, the court stated: 
"The e>xdnsion of the stat<·mPni s and eonver-
sations as to what the parties m<·:m1 h~' the lan.guag(' 
of tlw eontrad was eol'l'(•d. 11:\'i<l<'lH'<' of all (•ir-
cumstances prior to and contemponuwous with the 
PX(•(•ution of the (•ontnwt was admissable, hut oral 
statements of the pa r1 iPs of what t h<·~' in1 <'lHled tlt1• 
languag·e to mean wen• not.'' (('itin~· H.<•s1a1PmPn1 
of Coni rads, SPr. ~~0). 
The -:\filler rasP was ('ited with approval and the 
ahove language ftUOted hy th(• court in Ohio e it i.2'r'1/.\ 
• 
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'l'rust '~'· Air-Way Eler:trir· App. eorJJ., 56 F: ~..;;npp. 1010. 
-\gai:g- :·~A· Colvocore_ss~~ v. ,W asse.rman Co., 38 Del. 253, 
·tno A. 607, the court rc>lying upon Redion 2~0 of the Re-
~tatcmrnt stated: 
''Where, as in thif' case, the language of the 
contract is not in any ·~ense ambiguous, its meaning 
is or4inaril5; a question of law for the court to as-
certain from the instrument itself, ·and allegations 
as to:the intent of the parties with respect- to the 
meaning of the words used, and whether such in-
tent is shown by subsequent acts, or by the declara-
tions of the parties, made at or about the time of 
the execution of the contract, or otherwise, are usu-
ally of no import/' citing cases including Yalentine 
Y. Shepherd, 1 :J Ariz. :.2-l-l; ] GS Pac. 648. 
Tlw testinwny of Barker as to his understanding of 
Yanou~ \\·onls and proYisions was clearly inadmissable 
1wenns<• of it~ immateriality in the interpretation of the 
J\.greement and the trial court rrred in admitting such 
t<>stimony into eYidence oYer the objection of counsel for 
the appellant. ~.\~ will b<.' seen under Point -IY, that tc~­
timon:~ \\·ns aJRo inadmissable under the Parol EYidence 
H 11le. 
IV. 
The admission of certain testimony of Barker and Mr. and 
Mrs. Holbrook violated the Parol Evidence Rule. 
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It has been shown under Point III that the lower 
court erroneously allowed into evidence, over the obJec-
tion of counsel for appellant, testimony by lVIr. Barker, 
the buyer, as to what he understood certain terms and 
provisions of the Agreement to mean. rrhe error of the 
court did not stop there, however. The court also allowed 
(over objection of counsel for appellant) :Mr. Holbrook, 
one of the respondents, to testify: ( 1) that the attorney 
who drew the Agreement had assured him before draw-
ing it that it would be provided that in case of default of 
the buyers, sellers could retake the land and the chickens 
~H. 138, rrr. 122); (2) that Holbrook told the attorney 
that the agreement would have to provide that the buyers 
should maintain 8000 hens but that they could sell culls 
and replace them (R. 138, Tr. 122). l\Irs. Holbrooi(, the 
other respondent, was allowed to testify what was said 
at a time prior to the execution of the Agreement re-
specting ( 1) the right of the sellers to repos:-wss the 
property in case of default by buyers (R. 158, rrr. 143) ; 
(2) right of buyers to sell and replace chickens and Uwt 
the land and the chickens would remain the property of 
the sellers (R. 159, Tr. 144-); (i3) and that there was no 
(liscnssion respectin.'.!.' S(']>Hratin.'.!,' th(• (•hi('k<·ns from the 
land (R. 160, Tr. 140). 
~rhe admission of the testimony of Barker set out 
under Point III and the testimony of the respondentB. _Mr. 
and ~Irs. Holbrook, set out above, violated the Parol 11~\'i­
(lence Hule because the testimony changed and nullified 
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the terms of the integrated contract between the parties. 
rrhis was error. Erickson v. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102 
P. 2d 310. There are no terms in the contract which arc 
ambiguous and which need extrinsic evidence to explain 
them. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of, the Agreement which 
~Ir. Barker was allowed to explain are identical with 
provisions appearing in the l.Jniform Real Estate Con-
tract which has been widely used in this Btate for years 
by real estate brokers and lawyers. Can it now be ~aid 
that the meaning of the terms in those paragraphs such 
as "convey," "premises," and "property" are now am-
biguous and extrinsic testimony is needed to interpret 
them! For example, ::\I r. Barker was allowed to te~tii\ 
that the word "premises" appearing in Paragraph 16 
nwant both land and chickens (and presumably the other 
personal property sold under the Agrerment). Can the 
word ''premises'' which for yrars has· been accepted by 
1aw~·ers to refer to real property now become ambiguous 
:1nd therefore .in~tify the conrt in allowing testimony in 
<.>vidence that "prrmi~c·s" means chickens, and pre:::mm-
:t bl~- also a .irl'p, trailer, mill, c>gg grader, rg~: eleancr, 
~·t~Pd mixPr a11<l motor and electric pnmps: Certainl~­
no1! Ht•spondt>nts are S<'c>king· to find an mnhiguity 
when• 1lwn• is none. This conrt in Buthrauft r. :··iitrcr 
Kiuq Trest. Jli11. olid .llill. Co .. ~).) l·tah ~~~1, 80 P. ~d ;j~18, 
\'1<11 I'd: 
''ln :-mpport. of tlw i'ir~t theory mC>utioned, 
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plaintiffs haYe recourse to many matters beyond 
the face of the deed itself. This is not permissable 
unless the intent and meaning of the deed is 'Upon 
its face uncertain or obscure. In determiniug in-
tent, we are restrained to the language empl~yed 
-to the chosen vehicle of the thought and pur}Jose 
of its author. If the meaning is clear, we may not 
resort to extraneous aids to interpret, modify, add 
to, or subtract from its meaning. To do so would 
be to assume the function of making contracts for 
the parties under the guise of interpretation, a 
power not delegated to the courts." (Italics added). 
A similar statement was made by this court in Sf ar-
ley v. ])('Sr'1'ef Foods f1orp., 93 Ftah :J77, 74 P. ~d 1:2:21: 
''Courts have been quite rr~Hl~· to open tlw case 
to parol evidence to explain the intention of the 
maker where there is anything u11 the .fare of f li (' 
1/fdt gi r'ing ris(' to ambigtttity. This view is well in-
dicated by the cases cited h!· appellant. But wlh·n~ 
there is no ambiguity, the rule will not be relaxed. 
The intention of the parties must he gathered from 
the instrument itself. Any other rule would tend 
to destroy the value of written instruments.'' (cit-
in.!!." rasPs). (Italics added). 
The faet. of the matt<·r is that no prm·ision was m~Hl<> 
in the contract for tltc• sellers, n·spondPnts hPrein, to r<>-
tain title to tlw chickens, and h<•IH'<' nnd<·r S<•e. G0-2-3, 
l".C.A. 1!);"");~, title pass('<l to hu:r<•rs upon <~xpc•ui iou of the 
AgTPc·mc•I!L Respondents an• <>n<l<~avoring to gin· an 
integTatecl H.'~T<·<·ment a meaning c·ompl<'t<'l)· aliPu to 
:m:·thin.~· its wonls can possibly <'Xpr<'Sf' in order to de-
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f cat the provisions of 60-2-3. 
Even if appellant were to concede that the terms and 
provisions of the Agreement are ambiguous as to when 
title of the chickens was to pass, it would avail the re-
spondents nothing for Rule 1 of Sec. 60-2-3 provides that 
unless a different intent appears, title passes when the 
eontract is made. In Ileatll r. r. S., 209 F.2d 318, the 
court stated: that ''If the actual intent of the parties is 
ambiguous,'' resort should then be made to the rules of 
presumption found in [iniform Sales Act See. 19, which 
is our Sec. 60-2-3. TVillisfon on Sales, ReY. Ed., Vol. :2, 
~ec. 261, Pg. 9, states in discussing the question of inten-
t ion of the pa rtirs as to when title passes: 
'By intention in this connection is meant in 
the law of sales as throughout the lav~~ goYerning 
the formation of contracts, expressed intent. This 
is indicated by the proYisions of Ser. 18 ( :2) ( oi the 
1~niform Sales Art. Sec. no-:2-:2 r.C.~\. 1953). Par-
tie:-~ should not be allowed to tP~tifY as to their 
mental ii~tentl:", but nwn·l~- as to what they said and 
did .. , (citing C:lses). 
rrlw :-;nmt' rule \\"<l:-1 \H'll stated in Fo."frT 1'. Uoj)I'S, 111 
,\I as:-~. 10, ~Ylwre the ronrt :-~aid: 
"In all c:l~t'~. howe\·er, tlw intPnt nf tlH' partlL'::--
ns to wht'll the titlt' i~ to pas~ can be a~cl'rtnilll'll 
rilil,IJ fronl flu· terms of flu' Of/I'!'CIIII'Jd a." C.rJlr1'8S<'rf 
iu tlic lailrJitape and eowlnet of the partil'S, mid a::-; 
applit><l to known n:-~ag·e and the snhjeet tnatter. lt 
11111~1 lw Innnif<-'stcrl at the tinw tht' bargain is nuule. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
----------------------------------. 
The rights of the parties under the contract can-
not be affected by their undisclosed purposes, or by 
their understanding of its legal effect." (Italics 
added). 
St•t• the later ease of Jilfrray r. ludursky, 266 l\[ass. 
220, 165 X. E. 91, citing with approval the above rule 
from Fostl'r r. Ropes. 
Clearly, there was no ambiguity in the contrae! to 
he interpreted and extrinsic testimon~' of Barker, Mr. and 
~[rs. Holbrook, set out above, was erroneously admitted 
and considered hy the court in construing the Agreement. 
The trial judge b~· his consideration of this improperly 
admitted tt•stimm1~·, CQmpletely disregarded the provi-
sions of our Sales Aet ( N(•<·s. 60-2-2 and 60-2-3) as to 
when title pass(•s. 
v. 
The Agreement gave the Buyers the right to sell the 
chicker:s and the Sellers cannot therefore object to the Appel-
hnt's mortgage which was given for value. 
Assumin,:.!,' for til<' )Jill'JIOs<·s of our argument under 
this point that the (•ontrad proYidPs for tlw retention of 
title to th<• ehiekPns and replacements hy the sellers, it 
was admitted h~· n•sfHHHlPnts ht>low 1 hat tlH· <·on1rae1 
ga\·e the huy(•r t]H· right to re-sell the chickens. Certain-
ly in view of this authorization by th<· sellPrs, they could 
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not object had Barker sold the chickens to a purchaser 
for value .. The sellers could ~ave no ground to object to 
that which they had authorized. We contend that ap-
pellant was a purchaser for value and that the respond-
ents can no more object to his mortgage than they could 
had he purchased them from Barker for cash. 
While in this State we have not adopted the Uniform 
Conditional Hales Act, an exa~ination of that Act and 
decisions under it respecting the question here involved 
will be helpful. Sec . . 9 of the U. C. 8. A. provides that 
where the conditional seller ~xpressly or impliedl~T con-
sents to the re-sale of the property, the reservation of 
title shall be void against a purchm:;er from tlw bu~rer. 
\\'" c sc>t out that seetion in fnll: 
"\Vhere goods are deliYered under a eondi-
tional sale contract and the ~eller expressly or im-
pliedly consents that the hu!Ter may resell prior to 
the performance of the condition, the reservation 
of property shall be Yoid against purchasers trom 
the buy·er for value in the ordinary eourse of busi-
nrss, and as to them the buyer shall be deemed the 
owner of the goods, even though the contract or a 
eopy thereof ~hall he filed according to the provi-
sions of thi~ net.'' 
In Tdilf'nOff 1'. Jacobs. :2()7 .\pp. Div. ~)()8, 4G ).;, Y. 
Nupp. :2<1 R7:->, it W:l~ lwl<l that nndf'r ~l'<'. !) of the r. (_ '. S . 
. \. :1 n1ortgnp;re wn~ n "pnrehasrr" and tlw :-;eller had 
JIO ~tnwli11p; to ob.ird to hi~ nwrtg-ag-r·. 
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This court in Pedcral Laud Bank of Berkell'y v. Puce, 
87 Utah 156, 48 P. 2d 480, held that a mortgagee was a 
·'purchaser" within the meaning of our recording stat-
utes respecting real property. 
An illuminating case on the question here involved is 
Srlzocufelds h'tawlard Puru. Co. u. Sfoe, 173 Wash. 201, 
~~ P. ~~J 31)-J., ~where thl' conditional vendor of furniture 
impliedly consented to the resale of the furniture by the 
conditional vendee, and then attempted to defeat the 
rights of the ~nbpurchasers. Said t}_le court: 
"Appellant (vendor) further contends that the 
respondents (subpurchasers) did not rely upon an;· 
act or omission on the part of the appellant, but 
that, ha\·ing made a,n independent, ;·d complete, 
search of the reconJ.~, and having faih•d to a~ec·r­
tain the true ~tate· of title, it was their HegligPnec 
that oeeasi·;lJt•<l til< loss. It rna:· he emH·Pdt>d tlmt 
respondents did1nt g:o to tl!<' <>XtL>nt of pxamina·timJ 
and inquiry that prudent JH'l"~ons would ordiwu·il:· 
be called upon to ex<>r<'i~<'. But that, W<' think~ i~ 
IH·sidt• the point h<·r<·. If, as tlw <·onrt lJCid, tlte ap-
pellant conferred authority for the sale of tl1<> fur-
niturC' to respond<·His, it wonl<l he immaterial wlwt 
the records sh(~WP<l. ~1he mere I' ad 1 hat t liP titlt- or 
interest of thr· en" in posses~io11 of p<·rsonal prop-
ertv is (·\·i<l<·lH'<·d l>v a <·onclitional :-ml<·s <·ontrad ot' 
rec~rd would not <~ff<'d t hP right of such JH•r;-;on~ 
to sell the property if, as a mat 1 <·r of fad IH· ha~ <H'· 
tnal or implied authority to sell it; tlw authorit:· 
to sell such property impli<·s the expectation Ow t it 
will lH· sold, and also implies the anthorit:· to pass 
title to it if it is sold.'' 
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ao 
vVe submit that the above statement by the Wash-
ington court is sound. A conditional vendor cannot on 
one hand give authority to his conditional vendee to sell, 
and then, on the other hand, raise an objection to .the sale. 
Appellant should be entitled to the same protection of the 
rule since, as we have seen, he was a purchaser for value. 
lie took his chattel mortgage when approximately $3700 
\Vas owing to him by the Barkers, and upon the strength 
of the mortgage, allowed Barkers credit up to about 
$8000.00. As pointed out b~- the \Vashington court, ap-
<· 
pellant is entitled to prevail regardless of ·what notice 
he may have had of the contract between Hollands and 
Barkers. Had appellant fully read the Agreement be-
tween Holbrooks and Barkers, he could haYe only learned 
the Barkers had the authority to re-sell ,,·hieh, as we 
l~n,·r seen, includes the authority· to mortgage. 
rrh0 Snpreme < 1mut of California in Rm·t-lr nod 
!Jt.fllllHT ro. r. Bmwly. 192 ~al. 180, ~1 !1 Pae. -t-:1~. ~tated: 
''But pa~·ment 1~ of little importanee wlwn 
from thf~ face of the instrument it appears that the 
parti0~ intended to pass title irrespecti,·e of pa~-­
ment. rl1ln1s where the owner g·i,·l:.s to the buyer the 
right to re~Pll, anrl nothing i~ said in the agreement 
:1~ to the tim<.' when title should pa~~. the rnlt' i~ 
that title pa~~0s with the exerution of the in~trn­
ment, or at len~t when the time arri,·l~R when the 
hn~'('J' i~ in a pn~ition to l'l'~l'll, lweansr the rig·ht to 
l'<'srll pn'~nppns<'R the <.'xistrnre of a title which the 
bn~·<'r ran pas~ to the new pnrrh:1ser. ( eit i11_g· rH:-;P~). 
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:n 
Plaintiff believes that the question of notice is not 
material to the issues in this case. While the record dis-
doses only that he had notice of the fact there was an 
agreement, but had not seen it, let us assume the plaintiff 
had reaq it and had notice of the contents. In that eveut, 
the plaintiff has notice of what! ~[a~' we answer in that 
event he had notiee that the ecmtrad had no tith•-retain-
ing provisions respecting the chickens and did not re-
:-;ciTe title to replacements of chickens originally sold, all 
of which points have been heretofore argued in this brief. 
( 
1 Crtainl~· the plaintiff did not han• notice of oral under-
:-;tawling·s, sc·erl't or 11llPX}n·esse<1 constructions or inter-
pretations. 
Viewed in the light most faYorahle to the defc·m1ants, 
Barkers mort.~·ag't·d to tll<· plaintiff whate\·c•r inh•rest he 
had. in the chickens <lc•s<"rilJP<l in thP mortgage• and he 
had title to the repl<H·c·nw11ts. Plaintiff haYing notice• of 
the a!.!,Tc·c·m<·nt, had noti<"<' that Barkers had a legal titlP 
to the chickens which th<·~· mortg·H.!.!.'<•<l to him. 
Should th<· judgm<'llt of t h<· trial <'011rt lH· sustained, 
it will han~ the n·snlt that the dc•fpndants sold l'Pal uncl 
}J<•rsmwl prolH'rt)·, inelndin_•.!,· 8181 chickens, for a sum al-
~ost c·qual to *;)0,000.00, n·c·.<·i,·ing a down payme11t of 
approximately t h n•<'-fonrtlls of that amount, plus some 
-. 
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•'....J 
additional payments, and then recover all of the real 
property and certain trucks and 4000 chickens which are 
replacements and not the original chickens for an addi-
tional $5500.00 (Tr. 106, R. 122) which they paid to a 
bank on a G. I. loan and mortgage. At the same time, this 
plaintiff stands a loss of approximately $8000.00. As a 
matter of _equity, it may also be observed that had the 
plaintiff not extended credit to Barkers and supplied 
feed, there would have been no chickens left because 
Barker had exhausted his credit and had reached the 
end of the rope (Tr. 29, 71-73; R. 85, 87-89). Of neces· 
sity, Barker would have had to dispose of the chickens. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of 
1-he trial court should be re,~ersed and plaintiff should 
have judgment for the chickens involved in this action or 
thr valne thereof. 
Res /)f'r-tfully sub m iff('d, 
CLTxE, \Y n~;;;ox .t CLr~ E, 
.\XII 
RrcHARD C. Ilo"\'i'F., 
_.·ltforn,·y . .; for Ploilltiff and .~ppcllaut. 
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